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Event-Specific Earnings Management: Additional Evidence from US 
M&A Pre-and Post-SOX  
Abstract
:
 
We re-examine the motivation to manage earnings in US M&As, by investigating whether the 
enactment of SOX has affected pre-merger earnings management. Using a sample of over 700 
completed M&As of US public firms during 1999-2008. Using quarterly reports, we track-down 
earnings management during the four quarters preceding the deal and consequently draw 
inferences about the implications of SOX on interim reporting practices. We find evidence of 
earnings management by non-cash acquirers, especially during the two to three quarters prior to 
the announcement date; this practice is more pronounced in the post-SOX period, suggesting that 
SOX simply lead to an earlier exercise of pre-merger earnings management. More interestingly, 
we reveal significant upward earnings management by targets in the last quarter prior to the deal, 
but only during the post-SOX era.   
 
Keywords: Sarbanes Oxley, M&As, Earnings Management, Abnormal Accruals, Method of Payment, 
Quarterly Reports.    
JEL Classification: M41, M48, G34 
1. Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (hereafter SOX) in 2002, the debate regarding its 
implications on corporate reporting and governance consequences has been on-going (see, for 
example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Madura and Ngo, 2010). The debate has recently extended to 
several research areas in financial reporting, such as earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008) and in 
market efficiency and major business transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions (hereafter 
M&As) (Chelikani and D'Souza, 2011). This study contributes to this debate by examining earnings 
management in a structured sampling design of firms that engaged in M&As and by investigating how 
the magnitude of earnings management varies between the pre- and the post-SOX eras.   
The mathematical detection of earnings management proxies, such as the abnormal patterns in 
accruals, per se does not carry significant and meaningful implications, unless earnings management 
is associated with potential underlying managerial motives. Examples of such motives include loss 
avoidance (see, for example, Gore et al., 2007) as well as corporate events such as management buy-
outs (Perry and Williams, 1994), seasoned equity offerings (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998) and 
M&As (for example see Erickson and Wang, 1999). In M&A deals each of two parties ultimately 
involved, seeks to maximise their own gains in a “two-agent bargaining game under imperfect 
information” (Hansen, 1987, p.76). Given the information asymmetries, and considering how critical 
the figures are, it is argued that each party of the transaction may have incentives to manipulate the 
numbers prior to closing the deal; this, however, is not a costless procedure (Erickson and Wang, 
1999). 
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This study re-examines the motivation to manage earnings in firms engaged in M&As by addressing 
the question of whether firms’ pre-merger earnings management after the enactment of SOX has been 
significantly different from its level in the pre-SOX era. More specifically, we explore the different 
patterns and timing of pre-merger earnings management as well as the differences in earnings 
management practices between the pre and post-SOX eras in public firms engaged in M&As (i.e. 
acquiring and target firms).  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways: First, it tests earnings 
management occurrences prior to deal announcement not only for the acquiring firms, but also for 
their targets. Second, by investigating a structured sample of merging firms, which have an ex-ante 
motivation to practice earnings management. By employing a sample that includes M&A deals before 
and after SOX was enacted, our study adds to the debate on the effectiveness of SOX in improving the 
credibility of financial reporting. Finally, by using quarterly reports, this study provides a track of the 
managerial discretion over accruals in the four successive quarters prior to a deal’s announcement in 
order to precisely locate the timing of earnings management. 
2. Literature Review 
In a M&A deal, the target’s ability to manage its earnings preceding a M&A relies on when it learns 
about an acquiring firm’s intention to take it over (Botsari and Meeks, 2008). There is no standard 
timing of a target firm’s awareness about an impending M&A. The leakage of information and market 
rumours surrounding a M&A can effectively increase the target firm’s awareness about the emerging 
deal as frequently documented by the literature and empirically detected by abnormally high trading 
activity ahead of significant price movements of the target’s share (Chou et al., 2011). Unlike targets, 
acquirers normally have control over M&A timing and are able to plan their strategic investment 
decisions in advance. Therefore, as timing is not an issue for acquirers -and assuming they have the 
motivation to manage earnings- they should theoretically be more effective in doing so compared to 
their targets (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Alsharairi et al., 2015) 
Firms’ motives to merge with and acquire other firms are numerous and the basic underlying motives 
include expansion and growth, tax avoidance and/or financial motives. It is sometimes difficult to 
establish what the real reasons for a merger truly were, since the stated reasons at the time may not 
reveal the full truth (Gaughan, 2005). However, M&A activity is repeatedly justified by managers 
who argue that individual firms can efficiently generate greater benefits to their shareholders if they 
combine into one larger entity, thus generating synergies (Koumanakos et al., 2005). Therefore, 
making the M&A attractive to the shareholders of both involved entities is another managerial 
concern. 
According to Hansen’s (1987) theory of the management’s choice of payment method, as share prices 
are influenced by earnings management, an acquirer’s motivation to manage earnings differs 
depending on the use of equity in the payment structure (hereafter non-cash deals).The year 2002 – 
when SOX came into effect- was marked as beginning of a new era of corporate reporting and 
governance practices. Since the passage of SOX, researchers from both the academia (see, for 
example, Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 
2010) and the accounting profession (see, for example, Chambers et al., 2010) attempted to answer 
the controversial question of whether financial reports have become more credible or indeed, more 
accurate. As the ramifications of SOX are numerous, the discussion henceforth is limited to the 
empirical evidence on SOX and its implications specifically toward earnings management and M&As. 
Employing a large dataset of firms two years before and two years after SOX, Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
investigated the change in managerial discretions over financial reporting. They report a significant 
decline in abnormal accruals during the post-SOX period and a shift towards more conservative 
accounting practices. These findings were confirmed for dually listed public firms on Canadian and 
US stock exchanges for the same event window (Lobo and Zhou, 2010). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
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(2008) also investigated the impact of SOX requirements for reporting the effectiveness of internal 
control and found similar evidence, suggesting that the requirements of SOX do improve the quality 
of accruals.  
Adding to the above empirical studies, Chang and Sun (2009) and Iliev (2010) investigated whether 
the provisions of SOX have in fact improved the quality of earnings, as proxied by the level of 
earnings management. Their findings advocate the belief that corporate governance functions required 
under SOX have improved the quality of earnings (i.e. it has limited the practice of earnings 
management) as measured by the level of signed or unsigned (i.e. absolute value) discretionary 
accruals. 
In contrast to the literature that seems to support the mitigating effect of SOX on earnings 
management, Wilson (2009) and Ghosh et al. (2010) found no increase in the quality of reported 
earnings since the enactment of SOX, even after controlling for factors believed to influence 
discretionary accruals (including corporate governance). Also, Chambers et al. (2010) surveyed the 
recent research on the effectiveness of SOX and, rather unconvincingly, concluded that the quality of 
the financial reporting environment has in fact improved. However, they posit that “[t]he research is 
not yet at the point where an overall cost/benefit comparison can be made” (Chambers et al., 
2010p.27). Consistently, a recent study by Gavious and Rosenboim (2013) documents that post-SOX 
earnings management is significantly less negative than during the pre-SOX scandals. Therefore, they 
argue that such decrease in abnormal accruals has occurred as a response to the scandals, not as a 
consequence of the passage of SOX per se. Rutledge et al. (2014) report that earnings management of 
only those companies audited by the Big Four has actually declined during the post-SOX period. 
Whereas, earnings management of firms audited by non-Big Four auditors do not show a decline in 
the post-SOX period.  
Zang (2012) reports that as accrual earnings management is more constrained since the enactment of 
SOX, firms may rely on accrual earnings management to a lesser extent. Moreover, accrual earnings 
management is adopted to a greater extent compared to real activities manipulation when real- 
earnings management is more costly for firms. Although M&A activity was not explicitly dealt with 
in SOX, there is evidence that M&As have been greatly influenced since SOX. Mark Jamrozinski, 
partner and co-chair of Deloitte’s private equity practice, comments on the fashion of the focused due 
diligence which has evolved in the post-SOX era writing that “M&A due diligence has evolved from 
the financial verifications and skeleton hunts of the past into a focused, integrated approach that 
proves valuable in assessing the thesis behind doing a transaction (Jamrozinski, 2009, p.1).” In 
addition, Madura and Ngo (2010) provide evidence that since SOX, M&A candidates tend to rely 
heavily on financial and legal advisors, consequently reducing the informational asymmetry between 
acquirers and targets. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1. The target’s side 
Getting closer to the transaction itself, the managers of each party have proprietary information about 
their own firms, but asymmetric information about the state and value of the other, in a typical market 
for lemon’s problem (Akerlof, 1970).Under such conditions of  imperfect information the acquiring 
firm’s managers believe that the target will accept only an offer that is greater than its real value. 
Since acquirers may not discriminate those targets which are fairly priced, assuming all targets in the 
M&A market are lemons and normally overpriced, they will consequently discount the target’s value 
to avoid adverse selection. As a reaction, the target’s management is motivated to manage earnings 
and drive its market price upward – in order to ‘make–up’ the discount that the acquirer will apply. 
Hence, the first hypothesis in this study is formulated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Target firms manage their earnings upward prior to the announcement date of a M&A 
deal. 
3.2. The acquirer’s side 
Pre-merger earnings management implies two incentives to the acquiring firm: first, the acquirer has 
an incentive to obtain capital at a lower cost (Alsharairi and Salama, 2012), so the acquirer’s 
management attempts to reduce the number of shares issued to the target and retain stronger control. 
Second, the acquirer will try to mitigate the post-merger diluting effect on his shareholders’ voting 
and cash-flow rights (i.e. their EPS) by minimising the number of shares issued to the target’s 
shareholders during the exchange (Erickson and Wang, 1999). Hence, the non-cash acquirers are 
expected to manage earnings prior to a M&A deal and, therefore, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 2a: Acquiring firms manage their earnings prior to the announcement date of a M&A 
deal if they offer equity shares in the deal. 
Correspondingly, cash acquirers do not have the obvious motivation to manage their earnings, which 
makes it a costly process that carries no economic return. Hence, a priori according to the theoretical 
framework of this study, it should be expected that no pre-merger earnings management by cash 
acquirers should be undertaken: 
Hypothesis 2b: Acquiring firms do not manage their earnings prior to the announcement date of a 
pure cash M&A deal. 
3.3. Sarbanes-Oxley and earnings management  
The overall theoretical reasoning, based on the purpose of SOX and previous empirical evidence 
analysed in the literature review section, can establish the a priori suggestion that the implementation 
of SOX may enhance the containment of earnings management in a M&A context. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by firms engaged in M&A in post-
SOX deals is significantly lower than those in pre-SOX period. 
This hypothesis can be broken down into two sub-hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by target firms in post-SOX deals 
is significantly lower than those in pre-SOX period,  
and 
Hypothesis 3b: The magnitude of pre-merger earnings management by acquirers in post-SOX deals is 
significantly lower than those in pre-SOX period. 
4. Methodology  
4.1. Earnings Management Proxy 
Earnings management is examined for each of the acquirers and targets in each quarter for the last 
four quarters preceding the event of M&A - identified by the announcement date of the deal. 
Specifically, to identify the timing of earnings management decisions for a firm, abnormality in 
accruals is investigated in the quarterly earnings in quarters j-1 to j-4 from the announcement date of 
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M&A, hereafter EMj-1, EMj-2, EMj-3 and EMj-4, where j is the quarter in which the firm was announced 
as being involved in a M&A deal. As a robustness check, we also test the cumulative abnormal 
accruals for two quarters (C2), three quarters (C3) and four quarters (C4) before completing the 
M&A. 
Interim reporting, in contrast with annual reports, allows firms to plan earnings management through 
current accruals more efficiently. For instance, a firm’s management may use its accrual reserves in 
doses over more than one quarter (Das et al., 2009). The current accruals are computed using the 
changes in the non-cash working capital, the balance sheet method
1
 (Pungaliya and Vijh, 2008) as 
follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖 − (∆𝐶𝐿𝑖 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖) − ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖      (41) 
Where: 
CAC: denotes the current accruals,  
ΔCA: is the quarterly change in current assets (Compustat XPF mnemonic2 code ACTQ),  
ΔCL: is the quarterly change in current liabilities (mnemonic code LCTQ),  
ΔCASH: is the quarterly change in cash (mnemonic code CHEQ),  
ΔSTD: is the quarterly change in current maturities of long term debt and other short term liabilities 
included in current liabilities (mnemonic code DLCQ), and 
i: denotes the firm index which could be either an acquirer or a target. 
A cross-sectional industry-performance-matched accruals model is used in this study,  similar to the 
research designs of Louis (2004), Gong et al. (2008) and Atieh and Hussain (2012). The core of this 
model emanates from the work of Dechow et al.’s (1995) modified Jones’ (1991) model after 
considering Kothari et al.’s (2005) non-linear control for performance.3 
The industry-performance matching procedure is achieved in this model by building matching 
portfolios using the universe of firms in each quarter. More specifically, data of all firms available on 
Compustat is clustered by calendar years and quarters. In each quarter, all firms are categorised into 
industry sectors based on their 2-digit SIC. In each industry, all firms are ranked according to their 
performance - defined as ROA of same quarter last year - to form five quintiles. 
Before ranking firms portfolios into quintiles, three procedures are followed for stronger robustness 
and to reduce measurement error at this stage (Gong et al., 2008); discarding the universe outliers 
represented by observations that have the highest and the lowest 0.1 percent ROA, dismissing each 
observation with the absolute value of current accruals divided by lagged total assets greater than one 
(|𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑗/𝑇𝐴𝑗−4|  > 1) to reduce the likelihood of including observations with extreme values due to 
improper data entry in the database, and finally excluding portfolios with less than 20 observations. 
Each portfolio of peer firms is used as a firm’s control in order to estimate the parameters that are 
used in calculating the expected current accruals for each firm in the same portfolio. Therefore, the 
following cross-sectional model is estimated for each portfolio constructed by the aforementioned 
procedure: 
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗−4
= ∑ 𝜆1+𝑞𝑄1+𝑞,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜆5 (
[∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗−∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗]
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗−4
) +
3
𝑞=0
𝜆6 (
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗−4
) + 𝜆7 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑗
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗−4
) + 𝜀𝑖     (2) 
Where: 
Qq: is a dummy variable to control for seasonality, takes 1 if the deal is announced in quarter q prior to 
merger announcement and 0 if the otherwise,  
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ΔREV: is the quarterly change in sales (code REVTQ),  
ΔAR: is the quarterly change in accounts receivables (RECTQ),  
PPE: is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment in a quarter (PPENTQ),  
TAj-4: denotes the total assets in the same quarter last year (ATQ), and 
ε: denotes the residual term of the regression model. 
To reduce potential heteroskedasticity in residuals, all variables are scaled by the total assets in the 
same quarter last year as a deflating procedure, following the recommendation of Kothari et al. 
(2005).  
4.2. Sampling and Data 
4.2.1. Sample Construction 
The sample includes completed M&A deals that were announced in the ten year period (from 
01/01/1999 to 31/12/2008)
4
 and obtained according to the following criteria: 
1. Deals are completed between US acquirers and domestic targets. Excluding multi-national M&A 
deals is necessary to avoid the differences in the institutional settings and reporting standards (Erel 
et al., 2012);  
2. Acquirers and targets must be publicly listed companies for two reasons: to guarantee that both 
acquirers and targets were subject to SOX provisions in post-SOX period and to mitigate the 
differences in the level of information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target;
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3. Deals in which any acquirers or targets in the financial sector (SIC code between 6000-6999) are 
excluded. This is a common practice in the literature since the financial sector is subject to special 
regulations (see, for example, Erickson and Wang, 1999; Gong et al., 2008); 
4. The deal value should be greater than or equal to $1 million to exclude all deals of negligible sizes, 
in which the economic incentive to manage earnings is less likely (Erickson and Wang, 1999); 
5. A controlling ownership interest must be acquired in the deal (i.e. the acquirer owned less than 50% 
of the target before the deal and greater than 50% by completing the deal). 
The final sample consists of 704 M&A deals making 1,408 firm observations of acquirers and targets 
that comply with the sampling procedure as shown in Table 1.  
The required data are obtained from different sources including; Thomson ONE Banker and 
Compustat. Thomson ONE Banker is used for sampling and to obtain deal related data. However, 
earnings management and other quarterly accounting data are available on Compustat North America 
Fundamental Quarterly dataset
 
by Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Quarterly accounting data items are retrieved for the universe of firms available on Compustat for the 
years 1997 to 2008, which result in 212,447 firm-quarter observations clustered into 3,445 industry-
performance matched portfolios for all calendar quarters for the period.     
5.  Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 demonstrates the characteristics of the sample comprising of 704 deals. The total sample is 
roughly evenly distributed into 378 pre-SOX deals and 326 post-SOX deals (53.7 percent and 46.3 
percent respectively). A control group is formed of the pre-SOX deals and matched to a subsample of 
post-SOX deals for testing the third hypothesis, which compares earnings management in both eras. 
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Target Relatedness in Table 2 refers to matched 2-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target firms 
in a given deal. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents a comparison between the targets and their acquirers as well as the deals’ 
characteristics pre- and post-SOX.  
Comparing the ROA median value in pre-SOX (3.9 percent) with post-SOX (4.9 percent) does not 
indicate a high variation as the median is less sensitive to extreme values of acquirers’ ROA. In terms 
of Leverage, the aggregate sample of acquirers seems more homogeneous given that sample mean 
(standard deviation) in pre-SOX is 43.32 percent (22.5 percent) and in post-SOX  is 45.36 percent 
(25.1 percent) with roughly a similar median of 43.5 percent in both subsamples. Hence, it seems 
unlikely that the results are driven by the variations in either the firms’ performance or leverage.    
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
5.2. Earnings Management on the Acquirer’s Side 
The abnormal accruals in the overall sample of acquirers show an increasing trend over the four 
quarters prior to the M&A announcement, hitting a peak in the second pre-merger quarter (j-2) as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The results for the aggregate sample of acquirers in Panel A of Table 3 shows 
that EMj-2 has the highest mean (0.3952) and the lowest standard deviation (4.666), while EMj-4 has 
the lowest mean of abnormal accruals (-0.2247) with the highest standard deviation (6.013).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
When the acquirers’ sample is separated into pre- and post-SOX subsamples, the mean abnormal 
accruals in all four quarters prior to the M&A seems to be much higher in the post-SOX period when 
compared to the pre-SOX period.  
Figure 1 indicates that acquirers used to aggressively inflate their abnormal accruals in quarter j-2 in 
the pre-SOX era, while in the post-SOX time acquirers seem to consider earnings management earlier 
than before, up to three quarters prior to announcing the M&A itself.  
From Table 4, the t-values of the mean abnormal accruals in the second quarter (j-2) for the total 
sample (0.395), as well as for the post-SOX sample (0.511), indicate significant earnings management 
at a 5 percent confidence interval whereas there is no significant evidence of abnormal accruals found 
in the pre-SOX subsample. EMj-3 is not significant at the total sample level. 
Although acquirers’ mean abnormal accruals could exert negative values especially in the earlier 
quarters prior to a M&A, the acquirers’ mean cumulative abnormal accruals up to four quarters have 
always had positive values in the sample. However, the mean cumulative abnormal accruals over the 
past four quarters prior to a M&A (C4) in the post-SOX era has a much higher value when compared 
to pre-SOX times which are (1.4038) and (0.1154) respectively.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results in Table 4 only show a significant mean of 0.4869 for the post-SOX sample. This 
indicates that managers’ attitude toward earnings management has shifted in the post-SOX era as they 
do not wait until j-2 to start working out their reported earnings but rather they start inflating the 
accruals one quarter earlier (i.e. since j-3). Moreover, the mean cumulative abnormal accruals C2 are 
significant at the 5 percent confidence interval for both the total sample and the post-SOX sample. 
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The analysis for C3 provides further evidence of early earnings management during the current post-
SOX period. Even though the total sample mean (0.8589) of C3 is significant, it is not significant in 
the pre-SOX sample, but the post-SOX sample mean of C3 (1.4107) is very significant with a positive 
median (0.1948). Moreover, the cumulative abnormal accruals proxy C4 has a significant positive 
mean value (1.4038) in the post-SOX subsample. 
Table 5 shows that the two-sample mean differentials (i.e. post-SOX minus pre-SOX values) are 
positive since all earnings management proxies show a higher abnormal accruals mean for the post-
SOX subsample. However, the results suggest that EMj-3 and C3 are higher in the post-SOX time due 
to earlier earnings management. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.2.1. Analysing the segregated samples by the method of payment 
Figure 2 illustrates the acquirers’ mean abnormal accruals behaviour pre- and post-SOX after 
separating the acquirers sample into pure cash versus non-cash acquirers. By comparing Figure 2 with 
the previous graph of the overall sample in Figure 1, it can be seen that the same trend of earnings 
management patterns as described earlier for the overall sample holds only for firms which use equity 
in their payment method (i.e. non-cash acquirers), as shown in graph B of Figure 2. Non-cash 
acquirers in the post-SOX sample seem to begin managing their earnings early, starting in quarter j-3 
reaching the maximum mean of 0.7725, while pre-SOX non-cash acquirers maximise their abnormal 
accruals in quarter j-2 with a maximum mean of only 0.3668. Conversely, this does not ring true for 
pure cash acquirers as their pre-merger abnormal accruals curve in graph A of Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Furthermore, the levels of cumulative abnormal accruals are also higher for non-cash acquirers in 
general, and for those relating to the post-SOX era in particular.The analysis of the cash acquirers 
subsample as reported in Panel A of Table 6 reveals that for all earnings management proxies, the 
mean value of abnormal accruals is not significantly different from zero either for the total sample, the 
pre-SOX sample or indeed for the post-SOX sample. This finding is consistent with the predictions of 
hypothesis H2b. Therefore, the null hypothesis H02b in this study can be rejected since no statistical 
evidence is found to support (H02b: µEM (Cash acquirers) > or < 0).  
On the other hand, Panel B of the same table reveals some evidence for earnings management by non-
cash acquirers in the total subsample as well as in the pre- and post-SOX categories, despite the noted 
differences in the magnitude, timing and significance among the categories. In the total subsample of 
non-cash acquirers, the one-sample t-test (Wicoxon-Z test) for EMj-2, C2 and C3 all show significant 
positive means (medians) of 0.5163 (0.2465), 0.8168 (0.4037) and 1.0886 (0.6739) respectively.. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H02a: µEM (Non-cash acquirers) = 0) can be rejected. Furthermore, the 
alternative hypothesis (HA2a: µEM (Non-cash acquirers) > 0) can be accepted for the proxies EMj-2, C2 and C3.  
The above reported findings provide robust evidence that managers at non-cash acquirers adopted 
accruals-increasing techniques around two to three quarters prior to announcing the M&A deal. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The mean values, shown in Panel B of Table 6, for each of the earnings management proxies, EMj-2 
(0.6982) and C2 (1.1966), are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence interval 
while and the proxies EMj-3 (0.7725) and C4 (1.5960) means are significant at the 10 percent 
confidence interval. Additionally, the C3 proxy has a mean value of 1.9447 which is very significant 
at 1 percent confidence interval with a robust positive median of 0.820 (Wilcoxon-Z= 2.31). 
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Interestingly, the one-sample t-test for the pre-SOX category of non-cash acquirers, as shown in Panel 
B of Table 6, reveals strong results for the post-SOX categories. Although EMj-1, EMj-2, C2 and C3 all 
have positive means (0.310, 0.3668, 0.4953 and 0.2146, respectively), none are significant. However, 
the Wilcoxon-Z scores of the positive median values of EMj-1 (0.2548), EMj-2 (0.7031) and C2 
(0.7654) indicate significance at the 10 percent confidence interval, which suggests a late (i.e. closer 
to the deal’s announcement date) attempt to inflate pre-merger earnings. Further, the pre- versus post-
SOX mean differences for all earnings management proxies are positive, as shown in Table 7. 
However, the null hypothesis (H03b: µEM pre-SOX (Non-cash acquirers) = µEM post-SOX (Non-cash acquirers)) can be 
rejected for the differences of the proxies EMj-3 with a mean difference of 1.0588, and C3 with a mean 
difference of 1.7301. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (HA3b: µEM pre-SOX (Non-cash acquirers) < µEM post-SOX 
(Non-cash acquirers)) can be accepted. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Comparing the findings from the simultaneous analysis of the aggregate and segregated samples 
highlights the relevance and the importance of the stratification procedure through considering the 
payment method, when testing an earnings management hypothesis in a M&A setting. Furthermore, 
the pre- and post-SOX investigations of earnings management metrics show a greater magnitude, 
higher significance and an earlier exercise of accrual-inflating techniques in the post-SOX period. 
Additionally, there is some evidence for unexpected positive mean differentials of abnormal accruals 
between pre-SOX and post-SOX categories.    
5.3. Earnings Management on the Target’s Side 
Analysing the targets within the sample indicates that the mean values of abnormal accruals over the 
last four pre-merger quarters seem to generally decline until just before the very last quarter prior to 
the announcement date of M&A deal (quarter j-1) as exhibited in Figure 3. The resultant curves for 
the total sample and post-SOX category are U shaped and they, interestingly, look like a complete 
opposite to the acquirers’ curves of pre-merger abnormal accruals in Figure 1.  
At the overall sample level, the descriptive statistics reported in Panel C of Table 3 show that the 
mean abnormal accruals are highest in the quarter j-4 with a value of 0.8193 and a standard deviation 
of 6.2526. On the other hand, EMj-2 has the lowest mean value of abnormal accruals (-0.2253) with the 
highest standard deviation (6.8639). However, the results presented in Table 8 reveal that EMj-4 is the 
only earnings management proxy that has a positive mean (0.8193) significantly different from zero, 
at a 5 percent confidence interval. Its median value (0.383) is significantly positive with a Wilcoxon-Z 
value of 2.43. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
After splitting the targets sample into the pre- and post-SOX categories, the results show there are 
more significant proxies of earnings management. At times, the results indicate a dramatic shift in the 
direction of the abnormal accruals over a time window of four pre-merger quarters. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results of pre-SOX category of targets show that most of those statistically significant earnings 
management proxies have negative mean (median) values, as shown in Table 8. However, EMj-4 has 
the only positive mean (median) value of 1.2252 (0.4519), which is significant at the 10 percent 
confidence interval. 
In contrast, all earnings management proxies in the post-SOX category are positive. Additionally, 
each one, except for EMj-4, have much higher mean and median values when compared to those of 
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pre-SOX era as reported in Table 8. Although each of the proxies EMj-1, C2 and C4 has a mean value 
significantly different from zero, the evidence concerning earnings management in quarter j-1 is very 
important because it most likely is indicating that there is an intentional accruals manipulation due to 
being approached by the acquirer.  
These results indicate that the first null hypothesis (H01: µEM (Targets) = 0) can be rejected while the 
alternative hypothesis (HA1: µEM (Targets) > 0) can be accepted for the mean value (0.8222) of EMj-1 in 
the post-SOX category at a 10 percent confidence interval. The median value (0.7033) of EMj-1 is also 
significant at the 5 percent confidence interval indicating robustness.  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
Holding the pre-SOX category of targets as a control group, an awakening shift in targets’ practices 
toward more aggressive earnings management is noticed in post-SOX targets. More specifically, 
abnormal accruals for the pre-SOX group are negative on average for the past three pre-merger 
quarters, while the image appears completely opposite after the enactment of SOX onwards. This 
positive shift in targets’ earnings management behaviour is reported in Table 9 in which the results 
are evaluated specifically concerning the difference between pre- and post-SOX for all earnings 
management proxies.  
The results of testing the null hypothesis (H03a: µEM pre-SOX (Targets) = µEM post-SOX (Targets)) in Table 9 
confirm the observed positive shift in the proxies EMj-1, C2 and C3. The null hypothesis (H03a) can be 
rejected for these proxies while the alternative hypothesis (HA3a: µEM pre-SOX (Targets) < µEM post-SOX (Targets)) 
can be accepted at the 5 percent confidence interval level for the proxies EMj-1 and C3 with mean 
differences of 1.5541 and 2.3644 respectively, and at the 1 percent level for the proxy C2 and the 
respective mean difference of 2.0243. This inference is robust as it holds under the Wilcoxon-Z test at 
a confidence interval of 1 percent for the proxies EM j-1 and C3 and at the 5 percent level for C2. 
The overall results concerning the target clearly show there has been a dramatic change in the 
magnitude as well as the direction of abnormal accruals. The proposition that SOX has given targets a 
greater capability of manipulating their earnings in the very last quarter before announcing a M&A 
does not have any theoretical foundations and may be inaccurate to posit. However, the indirect call 
of SOX for more due diligence and a stronger use of M&A advisors (see Madura and Ngo, 2010) may 
have resulted in a longer duration for the deal’s to complete (which is 3 months on average) while 
there may also have been an effect for more efficient management in influencing EMj-1.    
Despite the fact that this study is using an ex post sample of targets, the intent of their respective 
managerial teams towards the acquisition (and therefore toward pre-merger earnings management) is 
still not easy to anticipate in terms of timing and therefore is subsequently not easy to control for. In 
other words, a M&A proposal could be an absolute surprise to some targets, while some other firms in 
the sample could be already working out their reports to boost their acquisition candidacy, as 
suggested by Meisel (2006). Therefore, an active decision by the firm’s management team to increase 
their firm’s acquisition attractiveness could be a motive to conduct early earnings management, which 
may explain the observed abnormal accruals in periods earlier than quarter j-1.  
To sum up, the documented results indicate that in the post-SOX era, non-cash acquirers begin pre-
merger upwards earnings management in an earlier quarter than in the pre-SOX era. Further, the 
findings indicate that in the quarters prior to the takeover, targets engage in more aggressive upwards 
earnings management in the post-SOX era. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper examines pre-merger earnings management in pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley eras over four 
quarters prior to the M&A announcement date. There are a number of contributions to the relevant 
literature presented by this paper. First, it reports the existence of earnings management for each of 
the last four quarters prior to the deal announcement not only for the acquiring firms, but also for their 
targets concurrently by using a sample that includes M&A deals before and after SOX was enacted. 
Second, it adds to the on-going debate of the effectiveness of SOX in improving the credibility of 
financial reporting by investigating a non-random (i.e. structured) sample of firms that have the 
motivation to practice earnings management – merging firms. Finally, by using quarterly reports, 
which are available by the US reporting environment, this study makes a further twofold contribution. 
On the one hand, quarterly statements are superior to annual ones in terms of their timeliness. This 
study provides a track of the accruals in the previous four successive quarters prior to a deal’s 
announcement in order to precisely locate the timing of manipulating earnings. Since quarterly 
statements are not audited by an external auditor unlike annual reports, this study provides an insight 
to some implications of SOX on the interim reporting practices, as Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) 
previously suggested for future research 
The findings of this study are consistent with those of Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis  (2004) Baik 
et al. (2007) and Botsari and Meeks (2008) reporting significant evidence of upward pre-merger 
earnings management by non-cash acquirers, which use their own shares in the deal’s payment 
structure, while, as expected, no evidence of pre-merger earnings management is found by cash 
acquirers since they lack the motivation to influence their share value before completing the deal. 
Earnings management is most evident in the second and the third quarter before the deal. 
We report evidence that in the post-SOX era, non-cash acquirers begin pre-merger upwards earnings 
management in an earlier quarter than in the pre-SOX era. Even when acquirers are not separated 
based on the payment method, significant evidence of per-merger earnings management is found 
similar to the results of Koumanakos et al. (2005). Consistent with Chahine et al. (2011), the overall 
evidence in this study does not support the argument that the containment of earnings management 
improved in the post-SOX era when compared to the pre-SOX era (which is argued by a number of 
studies such as, Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). 
Further, our evidence indicates that in the quarters prior to the takeover, targets engage in more 
aggressive upwards earnings management in the post-SOX era. It is noted that the ability of target 
firms to manage earnings before M&A has been a controversial issue in literature, not because they 
lack the incentive to do so as most would agree targets would certainly have a motive to influence 
their premerger value, but rather because of a time constraint (Easterwood, 1998; Erickson and Wang, 
1999; Meisel, 2006; Ben-Amar and Missonier-Piera, 2008). However, targets cannot systematically 
predict the time of their M&A candidacy, which inevitably varies considerably, because M&A 
transactions occur in a sporadic manner.  
One of the limitations of this study is assuming that firms have fully adopted SOX in the post-SOX 
period by ignoring the fact that SOX implementation went through a gradual implementations for its 
articles. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Sample selection criteria 
Criteria  Operator Description Count  
 Acquirer / Target nations Include US 205,661 
 Date announced Between 01/01/1999 to 12/31/2008 91,249 
 Deal status  Include Completed 70,018 
 Acquirer / Target listing status Include Public 4,273 
 Acquirer / Target SIC  Exclude Financial sector (SIC 60-69) 2,508 
 Deal value  Between $1 million to HI 2,296 
% shares owned prior announcement Between 0 to 50% 2,230 
 % shares owned after transaction Between 50% to 100% 1,421 
Firm’s identifier mismatch Exclude 8-CUSIP   704 
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Table 2: Sample distribution 
Panel A: Deals distribution by year Panel B: Deals distribution by payment method 
 Freq. %  Total Pre-SOX   Post-SOX 
1999 83 11.8  Freq.       % Freq.       % Freq.       % 
2000 130 18.5 Pure cash 268 38.1 123 32.5 145 44.5 
2001 102 14.5 
Non-cash 
Shares 436 61.9 255 67.5 181 55.5 2002 63 9.0 
2003 62 8.8 Total 704 100.0 378 100.0 326 100.0 
2004 59 8.4 Panel C: Deals distribution by target relatedness to acquirer 
2005 64 9.1  Total Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
2006 53 7.5  Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
2007 55 7.8 Related 457 64.9 240 63.5 217 66.6 
2008 33 4.7 Unrelated 247 35.1 138 36.5 109 33.4 
Total 704 100.0 Total 704 100.0 378 100.0 326 100.0 
Panel D: Sample distribution by acquirer and target industry 
SIC Division Group 
Acquirers Targets 
Freq. % Freq. % 
SIC 10 - SIC 14: Mining 48 6.8 45 6.4 
SIC 15 - SIC 17: Construction 0 0.0 3 0.4 
SIC 20 - SIC 39: Manufacturing 356 50.6 334 47.4 
SIC 40 - SIC 49: Transportation, communications, and utilities 74 10.5 65 9.2 
SIC 50 - SIC 51: Wholesale trade 12 1.7 11 1.6 
SIC 52 - SIC 59: Retail trade 15 2.1 18 2.6 
SIC 70 - SIC 89: Service industries 198 28.1 227 32.2 
SIC 91 - SIC 99: Public Administration  1 0.1 1 0.1 
Total 704 100.0 704 100.0 
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Table 3 Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the overall acquirers  
 Total (N=704) Pre-SOX (N=378) Post-SOX (N=326) 
 Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  
EMj-1  0.3224 0.0578 5.0702  0.3021 0.2482 5.0265  0.3483 -0.1788 5.1353  
EMj-2 0.3952 0.0526 4.6661  0.2840 0.3263 5.3167  0.5114 -0.0464 3.8777  
C2 0.6480 0.1115 6.7614  0.4894 0.1272 7.2631  0.8112 0.1115 6.2140  
EMj-3 0.1772 0.0563 5.1275  -0.1832 0.0273 5.6658  0.4869 0.0564 4.6038  
C3 0.8589 0.1133 8.2218  0.2437 0.0620 9.1300  1.4107 0.1948 7.2880  
EMj-4 -0.2247 -0.0240 6.0134  -0.3541 0.3920 6.5623  -0.1283 -0.3390 5.5805  
C4 0.8270 -0.1459 10.7007  0.1154 -0.0804 11.4741  1.4038 -0.2255 10.0190  
Size ($mil) 8,313.1 1,342.8 2,1824.7  7,857.6 1,287.9 2,2956.1  8,834.8 1,466.6 2,0476.1  
Profitability  -0.0409 0.0459 0.7272  -0.0780 0.0387 0.9726  0.0015 0.0488 0.2218  
Leverage  0.4428 0.4360 0.2377  0.4332 0.4350 0.2249  0.4536 0.4370 0.2514  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of non-cash acquirers 
 Total (N=436) Pre-SOX (N=255) Post-SOX (N=181) 
 Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  
EMj-1  0.4191 0.0625 5.3525  0.3010  0.2548 5.2507  0.5880  -0.1694 5.7415  
EMj-2 0.5163 0.2465 5.1132  0.3668  0.7031 6.1100  0.6982  -0.0951 4.0162  
C2 0.8168 0.4037 7.1384  0.4953  0.7654 7.7450  1.1966  0.4037 6.7150  
EMj-3 0.2448 0.1067 5.7796  -0.2863  0.0008 6.5649  0.7725  0.1600 5.0623  
C3 1.0886 0.6739 9.0072  0.2146  0.6740 10.1737  1.9447  0.8200 7.9779  
EMj-4 -0.4911 0.0061 6.6060  -0.6723  0.4054 7.8413  -0.3430  -0.0406 5.5671  
C4 0.7421 -0.1154 11.5098  -0.2436  0.4859 12.9965  1.5960  -0.0832 10.2098  
Size ($mil) 6,629.1 897.2 2,2055.3  8,876.3 903.6 3,7035.0  5,335.7 719.6 1,7959.5  
Profitability  -0.1053 0.0269 0.9132  -0.1565 0.0210 1.2177  -0.0524 0.0309 0.2728  
Leverage  0.4404 0.4060 0.2646  0.4005 0.3765 0.2302  0.4755 0.4240 0.3050  
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics of targets 
 Total (N=704) Pre-SOX (N=378) Post-SOX (N=326) 
 Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  
EMj-1  0.0049 -0.0002 5.8626  -0.7323 -0.5171 5.9775  0.8222 0.7033 5.6383  
EMj-2 -0.2253 -0.0944 6.8639  -0.5066 -0.1043 7.1949  0.0660 -0.0767 6.5120  
C2 -0.1105 -0.1947 6.9509  -1.1079 -0.5790 7.2552  0.9174 0.5408 6.4856  
EMj-3 0.0504 0.1711 6.0495  -0.1813 0.1184 4.5984  0.2659 0.3038 7.1470  
C3 -0.0793 -0.2541 8.2141  -1.2845 -1.3263 7.9559  1.0804 0.8324 8.3159  
EMj-4 0.8193 0.3830 6.2526  1.2252 0.4519 7.9586  0.4853 0.3678 4.3758  
C4 0.9010 0.8689 10.297  0.2241 0.2058 11.8308  1.4709 1.6972 8.7999  
Size ($mil) 938.6 115.6 3,424.7  858.5 101.4 2,931.2  1,033.6 136.4 3,934.0  
Profitability -0.4371 0.0015 4.8994  -0.5860 -0.0227 6.4075  -0.2597 0.0155 1.9242  
Leverage  1.8258 0.4270 33.640  2.8850 0.4220 45.5764  0.5589 0.4270 0.8424  
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of deals 
 Total (N=704) Pre-SOX (N=378) Post-SOX (N=326) 
 Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  Mean Median STD  
Deal value($mil) 1,566.9 234.6 5,531.3  1,407.4 212.4 5,060.3  1,752.0 270.1 6,034.1  
Premium 49.47 34.46 101.03  56.12 42.26 129.47  41.65 30.17 49.01  
Relative sales size 97.60 5.870 428.19  90.94 6.370 296.39  105.47 5.170 544.74  
Offer to target EPS 91.75 29.01 346.49  71.69 26.29 161.93  110.06 30.14 453.47  
 
. 
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Table 5: Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the acquirers by SOX 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Pre-SOX (N=378) 
Mean (Median) 
Post-SOX (N=326) 
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
Mean (Median) 
t-value Wilcoxon-Z 
EMj-1 0.3021(0.3022) 0.3483(-0.1788) 0.0462(-0.481) 0.10 1.48 
EMj-2 0.2840(0.3263) 0.5114(-0.0464) 0.2274(-0.3727) 0.56 0.21 
C2 0.4894(0.1273) 0.8112 (0.1115) 0.3218(-0.0158) 0.52 0.19 
EMj-3 0.1830(0.0273) 0.4869 (0.0564) 0.3039(0.0291) 1.44 0.84 
C3 0.2437(0.0620) 1.4107 (0.1948) 1.1670(0.1328) 1.47 0.46 
EMj-4 -0.354 (0.3920) -0.128 (-0.3390) 0.2260(-0.7310) 0.39 -1.33 
C4 0.1154(-0.0804) 1.4038(-0.2255) 1.2884(-0.1451) 1.21 -0.03 
 
 
Table 4: One-sample test of the acquirers’ earnings management 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Total (N=704) Pre SOX (N=378) Post SOX (N=326) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
EMj-1 0.3224 0.0578 0.3021 0.2482* 0.3483 -0.1788 
 (1.53) (0.97) (1.08) (-1.66)  (1.08) (-0.50) 
EMj-2 0.3952** 0.0526 * 0.2840 0.3263 0.5114** -0.0464 
 (1.96)  (1.77) (0.89) (-1.31) (2.14) (-1.06) 
C2 0.6480** 0.1115 0.4894 0.1272 0.8112** 0.1115 
 (2.11)  (1.04) (1.06) (-0.72) (2.02) (-0.65) 
EMj-3 0.1772 0.0563 -0.1832 0.0273 0.4869* 0.0564 
 (0.76) (0.78) (-0.49) (-0.11) (1.72) (-1.17) 
C3 0.8589** 0.1133* 0.2437 0.0620 1.4107*** 0.1948* 
 (2.20)  (1.91) (0.39) (-1.00) (2.95) (-1.67)  
EMj-4 -0.2247 -0.0240 -0.3541 0.3920 -0.1283 -0.3390 
 (-0.79) (-0.18) (-0.75) (-1.00) (-0.37) (-0.85) 
C4 0.8270 -0.1459 0.1154 -0.0804 1.4038** -0.2255 
 (1.57) (-1.51) (0.14) (-1.19) (2.11) (-0.95) 
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Table ‎6: One-sample test of earnings management for the acquirers’ by the method of payment and 
SOX 
Panel A: Pure cash acquirers 
Earnings management 
proxies 
Total (N=268) Pre-SOX (N=123) Post-SOX (N=145) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median (Wilcoxon-
Z) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
EM j-1 0.1364 0.0469 0.3048 0.1132 -0.0370 -0.0774 
 (-0.43) (0.23) (0.63) (0.39) (-0.09) (0.72) 
EM j-2 0.1732 -0.0544 0.0956 -0.1686 0.2348 0.0201 
 (-0.64) (0.11) (0.23) (0.45) (0.65) (0.32) 
C2 0.3051 -0.4769 0.4748 -0.8425 0.1730 -0.0754 
 (0.65) (0.86) (0.60) (0.67) (0.3) (0.45) 
EM j-3 0.0570 -0.0175 0.0466 -0.0082 0.0638 -0.0766 
 (-0.2) (0.24) (-0.11) (0.09) (0.17) (0.38) 
C3 0.4250 -0.717 0.3069 -1.0335 0.5147 -0.3035 
 (0.81) (0.75) (0.35) (0.61) (0.79) (0.50) 
EM j-4 0.2171 -0.2321 0.2581 0.4309 0.1911 -0.500 
 (-0.58) (0.12) (-0.67) (0.85) (0.34) (0.87) 
C4 0.9810 -0.1565 0.8393 -0.1371 1.0827 -0.2255 
 (1.30) (0.29) (0.83) (0.004) (1.01) (0.35) 
Panel B: Non- cash acquirers 
Earnings management 
proxies 
Total (N=436) Pre-SOX (N=255) Post-SOX (N=181) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
EM j-1 0.4191 0.0625 0.3010 0.2548* 0.5880 -0.1694 
 (-1.52) (1.31) (0.88) (1.71) (1.29) (0.17) 
EM j-2 
0.5163
* 0.2465** 0.3668 0.7031* 
0.6982*
* -0.0951 
 (1.88) (2.15) (-0.86) (1.74) (2.20) (1.08) 
C2 
0.8168
** 0.4037** 0.4953 0.7654* 
1.1966*
* 0.4037 
 (2.06) (2.34) (0.87) (1.74) (2.21) (1.54) 
EM j-3 0.2448 0.1067 
-
0.2863 0.0008 0.7725* 0.16* 
 (0.75) (1.11) (-0.56) (0.16) (1.93) (1.80) 
C3 
1.0886
** 0.6739*** 0.2146 0.674 
1.9447*
** 0.82** 
 (2.05) (2.7) (0.26) (1.48) (2.97) (2.31) 
EM j-4 -0.4911 0.0061 
-
0.6723 0.4054 -0.3430 -0.0406 
 (-1.25) (0.31) (-0.98) (0.58) (-0.77) (0.31) 
C4 0.7421 -0.1154 
-
0.2436 0.4859 1.5960* -0.0832 
 (1.05) (1.42) (-0.21) (0.81) (1.88) (1.09) 
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Table ‎7: Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the non-cash acquirers by SOX 
Earnings management 
proxies 
Pre-SOX 
(N=255) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Post-SOX 
(N=181) 
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
Mean (Median) 
t-value Wilcoxon-Z 
EM j-1 0.3010 (0.2548) 0.5880 (-0.1694) 0.287(-0.4242) 0.51 0.81 
EM j-2 0.3668 (0.7031) 0.6982 (-0.0951) 0.3314(-0.7982) 0.60 0.64 
C2 0.4953 (0.7654) 1.1966  (0.4037) 0.7013(-0.3617) 0.88 0.40 
EM j-3 -0.2863(0.0008) 0.7725 ( 0.1600) 1.0588(0.1592) 1.66* 0.34 
C3 0.2146 (0.6740) 1.9447  (0.8200) 1.7301(0.1460) 1.65* 0.42 
EM j-4 -0.6723(0.4054) -0.3430(-0.0406) 0.3293(-0.4460) 0.42 1.25 
C4 -0.2436(0.4859) 1.5960 (-0.0832) 1.8396(-0.5691) 1.30 0.06 
 
 
Table 8: One-sample test of the targets’ earnings management 
Earnings management 
proxies 
Total (N=704) Pre-SOX (N=378) Post-SOX (N=326) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-
Z) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
Mean 
(t-
value) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon-Z) 
EM j-1 0.0049 -0.0002 
-
0.7323
* -0.5171* 0.8222* 0.7033** 
 (0.02) (0.002) (-1.66) (-1.95)  (1.88)  (2.18) 
EM j-2 -0.2253 -0.0944 -0.5066 -0.1043 0.0660 -0.0767 
 (-0.61) (1.10) (-0.93) (-0.92) (0.13) (0.68) 
C2 -0.1105 -0.1947 
-
1.108*
* -0.579* 0.9174* 0.5408 
 (-0.29) (0.416) (-1.98) (-1.81) (1.81) (1.35) 
EM j-3 0.0504 0.1711 -0.1813 0.1184 0.2659 0.3038* 
 (0.15) (1.30) (-0.50) (-0.04) (0.49) (1.80) 
C3 -0.0793 -0.2541 
-
1.285*
* -1.326** 1.0804 0.8324* 
 (-0.17) (0.30) (-1.99) (-2.23) (1.64) (1.89) 
EM j-4 
0.8193*
* 
0.3830
** 
1.2252
* 0.4519* 0.4853 0.3678 
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 (2.34) (2.43) (1.85)  (1.89) (1.47) (1.58) 
C4 0.9010 0.8689 0.2241 0.2058 
1.4709*
* 1.697** 
 (1.49) (1.38) (0.22)  (-0.46) (2.10) (2.42) 
 
 
Table 09: Two-sample test of earnings management differences for the targets by SOX 
Earnings 
management 
proxies 
Pre-SOX 
(N=378) 
Mean (Median) 
Post-SOX 
(N=326) 
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
Mean (Median) 
t-value Wilcoxon-Z 
EM j-1 -0.732(-0.517) 0.8221(0.7032) 1.5541(1.2202) 2.50** 2.88*** 
EM j-2 -0.506(-0.104) 0.0660(-0.076) 0.5720(0.0280) 0.78 0.24 
C2 -1.107(-0.579) 0.9173(0.5407) 2.0243(1.1197) 2.69*** 2.25** 
EM j-3 -0.181(0.1183) 0.2659(0.3038) 0.4469(0.1855) 0.67 1.25 
C3 -1.284(-1.326) 1.0804(0.8323) 2.3644(2.1583) 2.57** 3.00*** 
EM j-4 1.2251(0.4519) 0.4852(0.3677) -0.7399(-0.0842) -1.05 -0.41 
C4 0.2240(0.2057) 1.4708(1.6971) 1.2468(1.4914) 1.03 1.94** 
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Figure 1: Acquirers’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
Notes: The figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly earnings of the overall 
sample of acquirers (N=704) as well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples (N=378 and 326 respectively) over 
the last four fiscal quarters prior to the M&A announcement. 
 
 
Figure 2: Acquirers’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A by payment method 
 
Notes: The figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly earnings of the overall 
sample of acquirers as well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples over the last four fiscal quarters prior to the 
M&A announcement after splitting acquirers by the method of payment.  
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Figure 3: Targets’ abnormal accruals prior to M&A 
Notes: The figure depicts the mean abnormal accruals percent detected in the quarterly earnings of the overall 
sample of targets (N=704) as well as the pre and post-SOX subsamples (N=378 and 326, respectively) over the 
last four fiscal quarters prior to the M&A announcement.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
  As a check for the method used in calculating the current accruals, the abnormal accruals are also calculated 
using the cash flow method for comparison, by which current accruals are calculated as CACCi,j= IBCQi,j-
OANCFQi,j+DPCQi,j, where IBCQi,j is income before extraordinary items appeared in the statement of cash 
flow of firm i at quarter j and this is calculated using the Compustat year-to-date item of a mnemonic code 
IBCY, OANCFQi,j is net cash flow from operating activities of firms i on quarter j but calculated using the 
year-to-date item of a mnemonic code OANCFY and DPCQi,j  is the depreciation and amortisation reported 
in the statement of cash flow of firm i on quarter j but calculated using the year-to-date item of a mnemonic 
code DPCY. The correlation coefficients are examined when relating abnormal accruals calculated using 
balance sheet method and cash flow method. Pearson’s coefficients range from 0.237 to 0.555 while 
Spearman’s coefficients range from 0.453 to 0.628 for both acquirers and targets. The coefficients found 
positive and very significant (P<0.00001) indicating additional robustness of the findings.  
2
  In late 2007 Compustat switched to Xpressfeed delivery mechanism (XPF) using mnemonic coding to data 
items. 
3
  This study follows Kothari et al. (2005) recommendation of employing portfolio performance matching 
instead of adding a performance measure as a regressor to the accrual regression model for more reliable 
results. 
4
  The sampling period cut-off point (31/12/2008) is determined once data collection for this study started in 
the beginning of 2009. The ten years period is chosen an ad hoc sampling period to include observations 
before and after SOX.   
5
  Baik et al. (2007) recommends that the estimation risk in the valuation of a private target is higher than that 
of a public target. Thus, this may motivate the acquirer to apply much more aggressive accounting in 
manipulating earnings prior to acquiring a private target, in an attempt to avoid overpayment. 
